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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Amanda N. Bolton appeals from an order requiring that she pay restitution in the
amount of $229.50. She argues only that the district court abused its discretion by failing
to give sufficient weight to her claim that she is unable to pay.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Bolton was charged with felony possession of methamphetamine in violation of
Idaho Code section 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.47-48.) She pleaded guilty, which plea was
accepted by the district court. (R., pp.49-56; Tr., p.14, Ls.10-15; p.16, Ls.13-16.)
The state requested restitution in the amount of $377.50 under Idaho Code section
37-2732(k), which permits the state to recoup prosecution and investigatory
costs―including costs incurred by state police and county prosecutors―associated with
that crime. (R., pp.60-64.) That amount was comprised of $100.00 requested by the
Idaho State Police for forensic testing of the methamphetamine possessed by Bolton (R.,
p.61), and $277.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office for 3.7 hours spent by
attorneys prosecuting the matter (R., pp.62-63).
Bolton filed an Objection to Restitution, objecting only to “the State’s requested
restitution in the amount of $277.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office.” (R.,
pp.65-66.) She stated that, “as a client of the Public Defender’s office,” she “meets the
statutory definition of indigent and lacks sufficient funds to pay for necessary expenses of
representation,” and asked the district court to “consider other fines that are to be
imposed on the Defendant as well as the Defendant’s ability to pay and the resources
available to the State” in ruling on the state’s restitution request. (R., p.65.)
1

At the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years and six months, with one year and six months fixed. (Tr., p.35, Ls.18-21; R.,
pp.71-74.) The state repeated its request for $377.50 in restitution. (Tr., p.20, Ls.2-17.)
Bolton did not object at that hearing to the state’s request for restitution generally, did not
object to the amount of restitution requested by the state in particular, did not introduce
any evidence regarding her ability (or, inability) to pay restitution, and did not in any
other way address the state’s restitution request. (See generally Tr., pp.19-36.) The
district court did not order Bolton to pay the full amount of restitution requested by the
state, but instead ordered that she pay only $229.50, comprised of $100.00 to the Idaho
State Police for forensic testing of the methamphetamine possessed by Bolton, and
$129.50 to the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office for attorney time associated with
prosecuting the matter. (Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36, L.9; R., pp.71-74.)
Bolton timely appealed. (R., pp.75-78.) She subsequently moved pro se under
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for a reduction of her sentence, requesting that the district court
impose a sentence of one year fixed and six indeterminate. (R., pp.81-83.) She later filed
an additional motion under Rule 35 with assistance of counsel. (R., pp.85-86.) The
district court granted the motion(s) and imposed a unified sentence of five years with one
year fixed. (R., pp.89-91.)
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ISSUES
Bolton states the issue on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Ms. Bolton to
pay restitution?

(Appellant’s brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Bolton preserved the propriety of either portion of the district court’s
restitution award for appeal?

2.

If so, has Bolton failed to show the district court’s order with respect to
restitution was an abuse of discretion?
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ARGUMENT
Bolton Has Not Preserved The Propriety Of The District Court’s Restitution Award For
Review And, Even If She Had, Cannot Show That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion
A.

Introduction
The district court ordered Bolton to pay $229.50 in restitution―$100.00 to the

Idaho State Police for forensic services and $129.50 to the Bannock County Prosecutor’s
Office for time spent by prosecutors. (Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36, L.9; R., pp.71-74.) On
appeal, Bolton argues only that the district court abused its discretion by failing to “give
sufficient weight to her financial resources, needs, and earning ability.” (Appellant’s
brief, p.5.)

Bolton’s argument is unsuccessful for two reasons.

First, she has not

preserved the propriety of either portion of the district court’s restitution award for
appeal. Second, even if she had, she cannot show that the district court abused its
discretion in ordering restitution as it did.

B.

Standard Of Review
“[R]estitution under section 37-2732(k) is discretionary.” State v. Cunningham,

161 Idaho 698, 700, 390 P.3d 424, 426 (2017). “What amount of restitution to award is a
question of fact for the district court, whose findings will not be disturbed if supported by
substantial evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

C.

Bolton Has Not Preserved A Challenge To Either Portion Of The Restitution
Award For Appellate Review
It is well settled that Idaho’s appellate courts “will not consider issues not raised

in the court below.” State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 563, 566 (Ct. App.
2011). “This limitation on appellate-court authority serves to induce the timely raising of
4

claims and objections, which gives the trial court the opportunity to consider and resolve
them.” State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted). While an exception to the preservation doctrine exists in
criminal proceedings for claims of fundamental error, “the fundamental error doctrine
may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for the first time on appeal because
restitution proceedings are civil in nature.” Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 834, 252 P.3d at
567.
Bolton did not object to the $100.00 the state requested for the Idaho State Police
for forensic services. Bolton’s Objection to Restitution only “object[ed] to the State’s
requested restitution in the amount of $277.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s
Office,” without anywhere mentioning the $100.00 requested by the Idaho State Police,
and without objecting generally to the state’s restitution request. (R., pp.65-66.) She has
therefore not preserved the propriety of that portion of the district court’s restitution
award for appeal. See, e.g., Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 833-36, 252 P.3d at 566-69
(addressing some, but not all, of appellant’s contentions regarding the alleged
impropriety of restitution award where some, but not all, of those contentions were raised
below).
Bolton has not preserved for appeal the propriety of the $129.50 awarded to the
Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office either. “It is well settled that in order for an issue to
be raised on appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the basis for
assignment of error.” State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 585, 199 P.3d 155, 160 (Ct.
App. 2008). When the state requested restitution, Bolton objected to paying $277.50 to
the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office because of an alleged inability to pay that
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amount. (R., pp.65-66.) While she asked that the district court “consider other fines that
are to be imposed on the Defendant as well as the Defendant’s ability to pay and the
resources available to the State” in evaluating the state’s restitution request, she did not
argue that any restitution award to the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office would be
improper, no matter the amount. (Id.) The district court thereafter awarded $129.50 for
that office (Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36, L.9; R., pp.71-74), less than half the amount requested
by the state and to which Bolton objected (R., pp.62-63, 65-66). The district court gave
Bolton what she asked for―it considered her ability to pay and awarded much less than
the requested $277.50. The record therefore reflects that the district court ruled favorably
on Bolton’s objection and there is no adverse ruling for appellate review. See State v.
Olson, 138 Idaho 438, 442, 64 P.3d 967, 971 (Ct. App. 2003) (holding that there was no
adverse ruling for appellate review where the district court sustained the appellant’s
objection below).
Bolton could still have preserved the issue for appeal by making clear to the
district court that even the $129.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office was
improper in light of her financial situation. At no point did she do so. At the hearing
during which the district court considered restitution, Bolton did not address restitution at
all. (See generally Tr., pp.19-36.) After announcing its restitution order, the district
court specifically asked Bolton and her attorney if they understood and had any
additional questions, at which point neither suggested that the restitution award was
objectionable, improper, or that Bolton would be unable to pay. (Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36,
L.17.) Following the restitution award, Bolton did not file any objection or request that
the amount designated for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office be further reduced.
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Bolton did not provide the district court an “opportunity to consider and resolve” any
objection that she was unable to pay $129.50, as opposed to $277.50, for costs of
prosecution. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. See also Kirkman v. Stoker, 134
Idaho 541, 544, 6 P.3d 397, 400 (2000) (holding that appellant failed to preserve issue for
appeal where, though appellant requested a jury trial in pleadings, he failed to bring the
issue to the district court’s attention when the district court later set a court trial).

D.

Even If Bolton Had Preserved The Propriety Of Either Or Both Portions Of The
District Court’s Restitution Award For Appeal, She Has Not Shown That The
District Court Abused Its Discretion
“[R]estitution under section 37-2732(k) is discretionary.” State v. Nelson, 161

Idaho 692, 695, 390 P.3d 418, 421 (2017). “Since I.C. § 37-2732(k) is short on specific
guidance regarding the nature of a restitution award or the procedure to obtain such an
award, [Idaho courts] find guidance in the general restitution statute, I.C. § 19-5304.”
State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 258, 281 P.3d 90, 95 (2012). “Specifically, section 195304(7) provides several factors for consideration, which may be relevant when awarding
restitution under section 37-2732(k), depending on the particular case.” State v. Kelley,
161 Idaho 686, 692, 390 P.3d 412, 418 (2017). While the “‘financial resources, needs
and earning ability of the defendant’” are factors that may be relevant depending on the
particular case, “‘[t]he immediate inability to pay restitution by a defendant shall not be,
in and of itself, a reason to not order restitution.’” Id. (quoting I.C. § 19-5304(7)). The
court can, for instance, “order restitution in contemplation of a future ability to pay.”
State v. Olpin, 140 Idaho 377, 380, 93 P.3d 708, 711 (Ct. App. 2004). Nor is it reversible
error for a district court to order restitution without explicitly discussing the defendant’s
ability to pay. See id. (holding that no abuse of discretion was shown where district court
7

ordered restitution without explicitly discussing ability to pay). In short, “inability to pay
does not preclude, or impose a limit upon, a restitution award,” but is just one nondispositive factor that may be relevant and may be considered in association with a
request for restitution, depending upon the particular case. State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878,
880, 71 P.3d 477, 479 (Ct. App. 2003).
Bolton does not argue that the district court failed to consider her alleged
(in)ability to pay, only that it failed to “give sufficient weight” to her alleged inability to
pay. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) She argues that the district court “should have further
reduced” the restitution award―though, without indicating what amount the district court
could have awarded without abusing its discretion―or should have “not ordered
restitution” at all, and that the failure to do either constituted an abuse of discretion. (Id.)
This argument is unsupported by the law and the record.
Bolton introduced no evidence at all to establish that she is now and will remain
unable to pay restitution. The district court therefore had no basis on which to make a
determination that Bolton was unable to pay. On appeal, she points only to the fact that
she was provided a public defender, and to a single statement in her Presentence
Investigation Report (“PSI”) 1 in which she claims she has a number of outstanding bills,
some of which are in collection, and is “concerned about having enough money to meet
her financial obligations.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 (citing PSI, pp.13, 15)).

1

Page references to the PSI correspond to the pagination of the thirty-three page pdf. file
titled “Confidential Certificate of Exhibits.”
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As to the fact that Bolton was appointed a public defender, there is certainly no
per se rule that criminal defendants who have been appointed a public defender cannot be
ordered to pay restitution. Idaho Code section 19-854(7) specifically provides that, upon
conviction, defendants who were appointed public defenders may be ordered to
reimburse the county notwithstanding “[t]he current inability of the indigent person to
pay the reimbursement.” Likewise, courts may award restitution under Idaho Code
section 37-2732(k) notwithstanding the defendant’s “‘immediate inability to pay
restitution.’” State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 692, 390 P.3d 412, 418 (2017) (quoting I.C.
§ 19-5304(7)).
As to the statement in the PSI, it also states that Bolton “does not feel she has a
problem holding steady employment” (PSI, p.13), and is a high school graduate with two
years of college education (PSI, p.12). Where the PSI explicitly addresses restitution, it
does not recommend against a restitution award, but states only that Bolton “may require
additional time” in order to pay. (PSI, p.5.) Bolton’s vague concern about having
enough money to meet financial obligations did not provide the district court with reason
to think that she would forever be unable to pay $229.50.
After Bolton’s objection to the state’s restitution request, and even though Bolton
presented no evidence of an inability to pay, the district court’s restitution award cut the
total amount requested by the state nearly in half, and cut the portion of that total amount
to which Bolton objected by more than half. (Compare R., p.60 (requesting $377.50,
with $277.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office), with Tr., p.35, L.22 – p.36,
L.1 (awarding $229.50, with $129.50 for the Bannock County Prosecutor’s Office)). The
district court took Bolton’s claimed inability to pay into consideration notwithstanding
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her failure to present any evidence or substantive argument in support. There is nothing
to suggest that the district court did not “sufficiently” do so, or that it abused its
discretion by failing to reduce that amount even more.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court’s restitution
order.
DATED this 25th day of January, 2019.

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 25th day of January, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below
by means of iCourt File and Serve:
JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Andrew V. Wake
ANDREW V. WAKE
Deputy Attorney General
AVW/dd
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